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 Feminism and consent: a genealogical inquiry 
 
Consent, power and the female self 
The sheer diversity of the feminist engagement with consent is testament not only to the 
fruitfulness and inventiveness of feminist scholarship but perhaps most importantly to the 
protean nature of the concept itself. Consent moves beyond disciplinary boundaries and 
through diverse territories within each discipline, attaching itself both to conceptual 
apparatuses and their practical applications. Privileged in accounts of the legitimacy of 
government and in normative ones concerning political obligation and citizenship, it has 
been posited as a fundamental principle of democratic ideology and social organization, 
whilst as a qualifying element for the legality of specific acts it has proven itself 
foundational to areas of both private and criminal law. 
In pursuing consent across such a rich variety of sites and citations, feminists have 
produced an impressive body of critical scholarship animated by an apparent discord 
between, on the one hand, the abstraction of consent’s theoretical postulation as a 
constitutive element of the political, ethical and legal order, and, on the other, its 
pragmatic application in concrete social contexts. These critiques can be broadly divided 
into two categories loosely distinguishable along disciplinary lines. Most of those 
oriented towards political theory, ethics and philosophy interrogate the relationship 
between the rhetoric of consent and the everyday experience of women’s personal lives 
wherein consent holds pivotal practical importance. In contrast, those undertaken by 
feminist legal scholars tend to focus on the micro-politics of consent, exploring law’s 
treatment of consent in specific contexts such as sexual violence, prostitution, the 
trafficking of women for the purpose of sexual exploitation, and the relationships 
between spouses.
1
 Yet despite exhibiting considerable variation these encounters share a 
common, unifying characteristic: they scrutinise consent in reference to liberal 
individualism’s vision of humanity. This is not to suggest that feminists engaged with 
issues of consent are necessarily advocates of liberal theory; rather that their writings 
apprehend consent as articulating a normative commitment to liberal subjectivity, one 
which privileges a specific representation, both of the consenting subject and the act of 
consent itself. The former is apprehended from the point of view of qualities that adorn 
the liberal self: a sense of self ontologically prior to any form of society and predicated 
upon an atomistic, disembodied, rational agency. The latter becomes more than a mere 
act of assent. According to the liberal ethic its essence lies in both its voluntarily nature 
and inner rationality, it being the outcome of individual judgement stemming from the 
subject’s freedom of will and independent choice to maximize self interest, welfare or 
pleasure, and being limited only by the negative effects it has upon the interests of others.  
Within feminist discourse this conception of consent as a function of liberal 
subjectivity has profound consequences, for not only does it fashion the substance and 
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form of the discourse, it also shapes its direction and the solutions proposed to any 
problems the use of the concept poses. For example, feminist re-readings of the idea that 
the social contract forms the basis for political association challenge contemporary 
representations of modern democratic society as a post-patriarchal social and political 
order. They contend that women neither consented to the original social contract nor to 
the sexual contract said to have preceded it and according to which they voluntarily 
subjected themselves to men. Here, the very evocation of the notion of social contract is 
seen to sustain a veneer of equality that masks real and continuing structural inequalities 
between the sexes and to thereby represent much of women’s social misery as 
‘consensual’. Drawing mainly upon data concerning sexuality and women’s experience 
of family life, feminists argue that the current normative paradigms under which existing 
social institutions operate disqualify female experience and effectively negate the 
possibility of genuine choice for women. In so doing these paradigms are seen to make a 
mockery of the notion of female freedom of consent and to repudiate the classical liberal 
view that these institutions were consensually born amongst equal, free, rational 
individuals (see Pateman, 1980, 1988, 1997; see also Clarke, 1979; Coole, 1986, 1994; 
Frazer and Lacey, 1993: 70-77). Similarly, feminist legal scholars ground their critiques 
of consent on juxtapositions of women’s social and legal realities. For example, judicial 
interpretations of the legal requirement of female consent in cases of annulment of 
arranged or forced marriages, and likewise those of ‘sexually transmitted debt’ involving 
wives as sureties, are seen as sustaining and reinforcing representations of women as 
immature or inexperienced, and as either too dependant on men, or as their victims in 
need of protection (Cretney, 1992: 537; Kaye, 1997: 46-47; Lim, 1996: 204-11; Diduck 
and Kaganas, 2006: 40-41).  
Such representations, in constructing women as submissive or victimised, in short, 
as bereft of the ‘blessings’ of the liberal self, are said to devalue and undermine the 
capability of real women to exercise meaningful consent. However, for others the legal 
recognition of women’s consensual capacity, as, for instance, in regard to prostitution or 
being trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation, is to be applauded. They see it as 
conferring upon women the power of agency and the status of rational and autonomous 
actor, and hence, as affirming women’s possession of the self-same liberal subjectivity 
credited to men (Sullivan, 2003: 76-79, 2004: 136-38; Doezema, 1998, 2005). Still others 
argue that law’s formal adherence to the concept of consent as the decisive criterion of 
the legality of an act ignores the pragmatic constraints that harsh reality places upon 
women’s consensual freedom and exercise of rational choice. For them, judicial 
indifference to or disregard of what they see as clear expressions of women’s non-
consent, for instance in cases concerning sexual violence, or where courts are insensitive 
to emotional pressure in situations where a woman acts as surety for husband or partner, 
serve to sustain male power over women and erase women’s possibility for agency, 
independent choice and self-determination (MacKinnon, 1989: 176-83, 2005: 242-48; 
Fehlberg, 1994: 474-75, 1996: 693-94; Naffine, 1994: 24-31; Duncan, 1995: 368-44; 
Richardson, 1996: 382-83; Auchmuty, 2002).  Furthermore not only do feminist 
interrogations of the concept of consent rest within the limits of the liberal legacy: so too 
do the solutions they propose to the problems they reveal. Any hope for change is either 
invested in propositions for a transformative normative politics or is directed towards 
pragmatic policy interventions. The first either embraces feminist attempts to remodel 
consent though remaining within the context of the contractarian tradition, or seeks to 
decentre and replace it as an analytical category of female experience with other, more 
suitable liberal values.
2
 The second aims to remove structural barriers preventing the 
flourishing of women’s freedom and autonomy and to give ‘true’ meaning to the notion 
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of female consent (Pateman, 1980, 1989; MacKinnon, 1982, 1983; Vega, 1988). 
This entanglement of consent with liberal individualism’s notion of self has 
become so pervasive within feminism that not only has the ability to consent come to 
signify the presence of the liberal female self, but a belief in the truth of this signification 
has come to provide the criterion for the feminist judgement on consent. For critics of 
contractarian stories of origin, consent is found wanting because its connotation of the 
liberal self is identified as a fiction; those emphasising the contextual obstacles to 
women’s consensual freedom label the requirement for consent as misleading, not 
because consent erroneously manifests this self, but because the real-life situations in 
which it is sought are seen to be so complex as to fundamentally disrupt the signification 
process; and both positive and negative attitudes towards the law’s demand for consent 
depend upon the critic’s faith in this process. Here, questions concerning the validity of 
the concept are largely conflated with those of female subjectivity. Yet this is not the 
result of a consensus within the feminist discourse in respect to liberal subjectivity. 
Rather, it is because the attachment of consent to the liberal self registers the existence 
and operation of another important parameter, namely that of power. Put simply, consent 
and female subjectivity are bound together by issues of power: the power men exercise 
over women, women’s power over themselves and their own lives, and the belief in the 
need to further empower women. Endorsement or rejection of consent is therefore 
predicated not only upon how effectively it communicates women as autonomous, 
rational and responsible political, social and economic actors, but also the anticipation of 
what will best affirm real women’s agency and mastery over themselves and strengthen 
their equal standing in private and public life. Similarly, the solutions, strategies and 
measures that feminist considerations of consent have to offer are designed to reduce and 
redress systemic power imbalances between the sexes, both as a whole and within the 
particularity of individual circumstances. 
In reading questions of consent as questions of female subjectivity and power, this 
chapter is not seeking to offer yet another exposition of the problems consent presents for 
feminist analysis. Neither is the intention to add to the solutions already suggested. 
Instead it poses the feminist discourse on consent as the object of inquiry and engages 
with questions about its nature and form. In short, it asks what precipitated the present 
configuration of this discourse. More specifically, it explores the conditions that allowed 
the apprehension of consent to become bound up with ideas of liberal subjectivity and the 
way in which they became indivisible from notions of power. In so doing however, it 
proffers neither an exhaustive historical account of the concept of consent nor a causative 
explanation for its attachment to the liberal subject. It presents a genealogical inquiry (see 
Foucault, 1977) into the relationship of consent and selfhood, one which, in exploring 
hitherto unsuspected affiliations and seemingly insignificant elements, maps out the 
historical ‘moments’ at which significant shifts occur in the apprehension of the 
relationship of consent and selfhood, and thereby reveals the singularity of events 
responsible for the way consent is employed within contemporary feminist scholarship.  
To this purpose the following text is divided into three parts. The first considers 
the initial valorisation of the concept of consent in Roman law and Stoic philosophy in 
the constitution of a hermeneutics of human action; the second traces a shift in the 
meaning of consent wherein as a key element of a religious or civic subjectivity it became 
a necessary condition of the creation and legitimacy of the order of the social - a shift 





centuries; and the third, secured by the historical footholds provided by the preceding 
two, accounts for consent’s association with notions of power and offers an appraisal of 
the modern feminist discourse of consent, the affiliations and aspirations it bears, and a 
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critical evaluation of the possibilities it promises. 
 
Consent and the hermeneutics of human action  
Derived from the Latin verb consentire, meaning to share physically, emotionally or 
intellectually, the word ‘consent’ originally emphasized the inter-relational element 
present in all instances of compliance and communicated an act of voluntary agreement. 
It was this apprehension, of consent as the objective, ‘neutral’ descriptor of mutual 
concurrence, which marked its adoption and use during Greek and Roman antiquity, both 
in judicial and philosophical accounts of human action. 
As early as the period of the Republic, in Roman law the presence of consent 
comprised the sole requirement for granting legal status to a number of everyday 
activities, ranging from marriage and the formation of partnerships, to hiring, purchasing 
and sales. For example, a distinct category of legally binding contract demanded no other 
condition or formality besides having been agreed, and was equally easily invalidated by 
consent to the contrary (Sohm, 1907: 374, 396-408; Schulz, 1951: 524-26; Buckland, 
1957: 251-54, 277-78, 348).
3
 Similarly, engagements and marriages, which were likened 
to consensual contracts by Gaius (Digest 20.1.4), were legally validated or dissolved 
simply by the informal declaration of consent from the interested parties (Digest 23.1.4, 
23.2.2., 35.1.15).
4
 Such legal privileging of consent stemmed from jurists’ efforts to 
project legal meaning onto conventional articulations of human volition bearing particular 
significance for the individuals directly involved and the wider community. Consent was 
therefore understood very much in a pragmatic way, functioning in law, as it did in 
common language, as a sign of agreement, with its juridical exercise connoting voluntary 
participation of parties in a specific action and their assent to its legal effects. Indeed, the 
overwhelmingly practical nature of this engagement is attested to by the absence of any 
definition in law as to what the term consent actually meant. It was there to be objectively 
discovered in each instance and was a matter of fact rather than one of legal principle.
5
 
Outside law the first major employment of consent as a key concept took place in 
schools of Hellenistic philosophy, most notably that of the Stoics.
6
 Here, in contrast with 
other philosophers who identified reason alone as being in charge of purposive activity, 
the Stoics posited a cooperation of reason with ‘assent’ (συγκατάθεσις) (Long and 
Sedley, 1987: 40b, I, h3, k3, o).
7
 They understood the process as involving two additional 
elements, ‘presentation’ and ‘impulse’, which together with ‘assent’ and ‘reason’ were 
considered to be powers of the soul inhabiting the heart and to operate in combination to 
generate human action.
8
 The first of these, ‘presentation’, referred to the stimulus 
received, and, as the impression of the external world upon the soul, comprised the force 
providing the direct cause of action. However, in being mere impressions of the external 
world, presentations in themselves could not constitute objects of consent. It was only 
when transformed into language as words and concepts to be clarified and built upon 
through discursive thought to form and inform meaningful propositions, that they ceased 
to provide more than a mere awareness in the subject. Only then did they enter the realm 
of human reason as rational propositions, become evaluated as objects of assent, and the 
impulse they generated be granted or refused (Long and Sedley, 1987: 33c, 33d; see also 
Inwood, 1987: 57-60). Whereas in animals the impulses were thought of as mechanical, 
instinctive, responses to the impressions wrought by the environment, in humans they 
were seen as mediated by the mental act of assent, the rational approval of one’s 
impression and the course of action it suggested.  
As in law, the Stoic’s ‘isolation’ and incorporation of consent was predicated 
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upon its function as an objective descriptor, although here it did not indicate agreement 
between persons about the performance of specific acts. Instead, in being posited as the 
locus wherein the rationality of the action-guiding process was manifested, it connoted 
accord between reason and the voluntary execution of any act, a concurrence deemed 
necessary to all activities appropriate to achieving one’s ends. So whether the context was 
legal or philosophical, the centrality of consent essentially depended on its instrumental 
value, with its ‘discovery’ dictated by the logic of an interpretative account, it being 
incidental to a legal or philosophical hermeneutics of human action. In being incorporated 
in this way, consent did more than signify acts as consensual; it also distinguished them 
from others and, in so doing, provided an analytical category of human action.  
Within Roman law this analytic significance of consent lay in the separation and 
differential legal treatment of certain consensual acts, with justification for this distinction 
being found, not solely in the nature of the act, but also in its association with the nature 
of its subject. Specific acts were seen as ‘natural’ and peculiarly suited to humankind 
because their performance was either in accord with human physical characteristics or 
was associated with the rational ordering of their general interests and consequently 
necessary to humanity’s common welfare. In being considered essentially natural, these 
acts produced self-evident obligations requiring no further explanation as to why they 
were actionable other than that they were expressions of the universality of the human 
condition.
9
 Indeed, this connection is attested to by their being grounded upon nature’s 
law, the law common to all living things, or resting within the jurisdiction of ius gentium, 
the law established by natural reason and applicable to all persons, not only the Roman 
citizens (Digest 1.1.1.3, 23.2.1, 1.1.9, 19.2.1, 18.1.1.2; Gaius, 1988: 33.154; Cicero, 
1975: I.4.11-13). So in endowing commonplace, informal, real-life consensual activities 
with legal form, jurists did more than engage in a legal hermeneutics of action; they also 
embraced a hermeneutics of the self, for within the interpretative claims they articulated 
about human action there resided the truth of the acts themselves and, most importantly, 
that of the performing subject.  
 Unlike the jurist, for the Stoic philosopher the analytic significance of consent lay 
not in separating ‘naturally’ consensual acts from others: the very assertion that a moment 
of assent prefaced every voluntary action precluded such distinctions. Also unlike the 
jurist, the Stoic philosopher’s adoption of assent provided no testament to the 
indisputable rationality of a particular act: assent always connoted agreement with reason 
and so demonstrated the rational quality of all human activity.
10
 Yet despite the capacity 
to assent being the property of all humans, it was conditional upon age, natural aptitude 
and intelligence, with its lack, presence, or quality distinguishing the activities of animals 
from humans, adults from young children, and the intelligent from the simple (Long and 
Sedley, 1987: 41a).
11
 Moreover, any ‘decision’ to grant or withhold assent, in being the 
actor’s ‘internal’ response to the action suggested by the ‘impulse’, was within the 
person’s control, being formed and informed by personal circumstances, nationality, 
profession, gender, social and familial status, as well as by individual habits, beliefs and 
education, and thus the expression of the actor’s personality and character (Rist, 1969: 
34; Long, 1991: 118; Long, 2000: 164-72). Assent was now transformed into a highly 
individualized measure of human activity, separating and selecting acts in accord with 
one’s better judgement, reason, virtue, or vice, while rejecting all others.  
This apprehension of assent did not, however, signal a belief in the agent’s liberal 
choice of action, as it has been suggested (see, e.g., Kahn, 1988: 244; Taylor, 1989, 137). 
Central to Stoic philosophy was the notion of fate, of Zeus’s will, securing the certainty 
that accompanied the ‘natural arrangement of all things’, a providentially ordered plan 
according to which the world and everything in it followed a pre-ordained path (Long and 
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Sedley, 1987: 20e, h, f, 38e, g, 54b, v, 55, 70g; see also Gould, 1974; Sandbach, 1994: 
79-82). Hence, in addition to the capability for assent being determined by fate, fate also 
marked the life and experience of the agent and thereby directed and shaped assent’s 
choice of action. That the agent could not help but act as s/he did negated neither the fact 
that it was s/he who acted nor the praiseworthy or shameful nature of this act; it did 
nothing to diminish ethical responsibility for the failure or success to act in agreement 
with one’s own particular humanity. Though bound by divine will, assent’s choice of acts 
marked the ethical quality of these acts, with the only freedom to assent being exercised 
in the responsibility to fulfil the potential of one’s own nature, a freedom often defined as 
the ‘freedom to obey God’ (Seneca, 1932: 15.7; Diogenes Laertius, 1925: II.7.147).
12
  
Operating at the intersection of cognition and moral life, assent therefore 
functioned both as an objective criterion of human conduct, distinguishing acts by 
assigning them to different developmental stages of life, and as a subjective one, 
authorising acts agreeable with the actor’s natural and social potentials. In so postulating 
consent as a generic principle of human activity and in associating it with the individual’s 
ethical and social persona, the Stoic philosopher, in a similar way to the jurist, engaged in 
an interpretative account of human action while at the same time articulating knowledge 
claims about the truth of the consenting subject. Here then, as in law, a hermeneutics of 
action was intimately linked to a hermeneutics of the self. For Roman lawyers and Stoic 
philosophers alike, knowledge of the truth of the self resided not in a priori posited 
ontological qualifications but in the very acts the self performed. Only in the nature and 
quality of the assented acts, in the degree of maturity and wisdom they exhibited, could 
the universal, natural and concrete, singular humanity of the subject, be laid bare.
13
 
Thus was the appreciation of consent in antiquity, though anthropological in 
nature, not anthropocentric in focus. Neither the legal nor philosophical accounts of 
consent were driven by subjectivist concerns or claimed constituency to a metaphysics of 
the subject. No reference was made to a ‘thinking thing’, a unity of consciousness and 
self consciousness, which, in being sole author of its own volitions, possessed freedom of 
will and moral autonomy; this would be the subject much post-Cartesian philosophy 
would cherish so highly. Instead, being validated as a qualifier of purposive conduct 
within a legal and philosophical hermeneutics of action, which was also espoused to a 
hermeneutics of the self, consent was not only a necessary condition of the former but it 
also became a constitutive part of the latter. 
In the centuries to come, the apprehension of the relationship of consent and 
selfhood remained essentially unchanged, although St Augustine’s ‘invention’ of the 
human will as an independent faculty of the mind modelled upon that of God, tarnished 
consent’s centrality in the process of the generation and ethical qualification of human 
action.
14
 Not only was the will the sole ‘mover’ of all intellectual and practical activity 
but because all activity lay within its power, it was also the locus of the actor’s ethical 
responsibility.
15
 Whether thought of as free to do as it wished, as aided by rational 
deliberation, or as irrevocably wounded by original sin, vulnerable to concupiscence, and 
thus in need of God’s grace, it was in the nature and quality of the acts to which the will 
assented that the knowledge and truth of the self was to be sought (Augustine, 387-
8/1964: I.xiii, xvi.117, II. i.5, II.xviii, III.Ix, xx; Augustine, 427/1964: 4; Aquinas, 1265-
74/1970: Ia.82.3-4, 83.4, Ia2ae.15, Ia.IIae.77.3). Consensual acts were hence no longer 
differentiated into natural and juristic ones or into those whose performance may or may 
not fail to conform to the individual actor’s ‘fated’ nature. They provided no testimony as 
to the humanity, personality or character of the performing subject, but instead, being 
bearers of its intentions, secret thoughts and inner-most desires motivating its decision to 
act, were the marks of the presence or lack of a sinful will. Whether actually performed or 
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just wished therefore, they needed to be deciphered; they must be closely examined and 
interrogated so that the disposition of the actor’s will was established and the truth of the 
Christian self revealed. So within the voluntaristic tradition of the Middle Ages, consent, 
although continuing to partake in a process embracing explications of the ‘mechanics’ of 
human action and of the performing subject, now loses its ‘autonomy’ and resides in the 
shadow of the human will. Still communicating an act of agreement, it does so neither as 
an objective descriptor of the nature of an act nor as a power of the rational soul sharing 
equal standing with reason: it does so as a representation of the human will, with actions 
‘called voluntarily from the fact that we consent to them’ (Aquinas 1265-74/1970: 
Ia.IIae.15.4).  
 
Consent and the deontology of order 
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed a radical shift in the way consent was 
apprehended. Though still associated with the faculty of will consent ceased to be 
privileged solely as the mark of its disposition, and consensual acts became more than 
merely evidence of the soul’s struggle to choose godly pursuits over earthly pleasures. 
Expanding beyond the interiority of the self to embrace the external world, consent 
became bound up with the subject’s worldly being and took on a pivotal role in the 
constitution of any of the multiplicity of visions of social order offered by the times; 
those theocratic and salvational, as articulated in the teachings and experiments of the 
radical reformers, and secular ones of a moral and political nature advocated in the ‘civil 
philosophies’ of the modern natural law thinkers.
16
 This is not to suggest that a socially 
oriented appreciation of consent had been entirely unknown during the Latin Middle 
Ages. It had been widely employed in medieval ecclesiology and the political theories of 
the scholastics, where in representing community will it had been closely associated with 
notions of secular and religious government. As either assemblies of the people or bodies 
of the faithful, communities had been seen to possess a corporate personhood, and hence 
to enjoy a common, singular will to enter into agreements binding upon each and every 
member.
17
 Yet this form of consent had not been essential for the appointment of 
legitimate authority because existing hierarchical political arrangements, together with 
each person’s place within them, were unquestionably accepted as divinely ordained. The 
community’s granting of consent was of procedural significance only, simply affirming 
the natural necessity of rule, together with people’s obligation of obedience and voluntary 
submission to a ruler whose legitimacy was already established; it was a result rather than 
cause of legitimate government
18
 (Kern, 1948: 69-70; Ullman, 1957; Gough, 1963: 41, 
46-47; Tierney, 1982: 39-41; Oakley, 1983: 324). With its new incarnation however, 
consent was no longer to be perceived of in a corporate sense, nor was its social relevance 
realised in its facilitating a procedural step in the establishment of government. Instead, in 
embracing the life of every individual member of the community, it became central to 
what Taylor (1989: 13-14, 23) describes as the Protestant Reformation’s ‘affirmation of 
ordinary life’.  
Reformation calls for a new way of living that revived the communal ways of the 
Apostolic Church with its commitment to teaching and living the Gospel, rested on the 
belief that whoever answered the call entered into a covenant with God in the hope of 
becoming the ‘elect’ of His love and mercy; those for whom the promise of salvation and 
eternal life would be fulfilled.
19
 Founded in Christ’s suffering and death, this covenant, a 
sign of divine justice manifesting the will of a provident and omnipotent Lord, was 
central to all reformation theology, both magisterial and radical alike (Calvin, 1949: II. vi; 
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1540-64/1958: Gen.17.7, 25.33, Heb. 9.15, John 3.16, Mt.10.6; Zwingli 1525/1981: 99-
100).
20
 For the magisterial reformers, since establishing a saving relationship with God 
was a matter of divine predestination and election, the offer of the covenant was neither 
grounded upon the dignity of human nature nor depended upon merits evidenced in the 
possession of unassailable faith or the practice of good works; it relied on God’s grace 
alone. Consequently, its fulfilment required neither rational deliberation nor the presence 
of a free will on the part of the believer (Calvin, 1949: II. ii. 10-13, III. ii 11-12; 1540-
64/1958: Dan. 9.4, Mal.1.1, Rom. 11.34, John 6.40; Zwingli 1525/1981: 118-137).
21
 For 
the radical reformers however, the covenant was a voluntary and mutually binding 
agreement according to which the faithful had to earn their place at His table by a total 
and free commitment of will to a complete regeneration of the Christian self (Müntzer, 
1524, cited in Gritsch, 1989: 57-61; Denck, 1526/1957: 94, 96, 100-1; Hubmaier, 
1527/1957: 124-32; Hut, 1520-27/1991: 162-63; Hofmann, 1533, cited in Williams, 
1962: 263, 285; Riedeman, 1545/1968: 146; Karlstadt and Grebel, cited in Pater, 1984: 
152).
22
 This could not be achieved purely with a spiritual preparation of one’s soul to 
receive the Divine. Although faith was indispensable, this regeneration also required 
material rebirth through voluntary immersion in a novel form of social existence the 
‘truly converted’ practised in communities the radical reformers established for this very 
purpose. The human side of the covenant thus involved a free and voluntary agreement to 
assume a strictly disciplined life, which, though lived on earth, partook of the heavenly 
fabric. Only here, in a society separated from the godless world and its degenerate 
established Churches, its State, laws, courts and oaths, as well as its wars and violence, 
could the ‘brethren’ who broke bread together, pursue a pure, honest life in full accord 
with His word (Sattler, 1527/1968; see Troeletsch, 1956: 694-99 and Clasen, 1972: 152-
209).
23
 Fulfilment of the covenant, and hence redemption of the Christian self therefore, 
depended not only on adherence to the prescriptions of an ethical and otherworldly 
salvational order, but also on actually enacting them within a congregation of equals that 
transcended the boundaries of the institutional Church. 
Agreement to this double pledge demanded an act of verification that clearly and 
unambiguously communicated the individual believer’s consent as being freely given. 
This act, likened to a ‘signature’ to the terms of the covenant, was the request and 
performance of baptism (Troeltsch, 1956: II.695-6; Williams and Mergal, 1957: 21; 
Hillerbrand, 1971: 73; Clasen, 1972: 95-106; Hostetler, 1974: 7-8; Baylor, 1991: xvii). 
However, the radical reformers, in seeing children as having neither the maturity nor will 
to understand the meaning and significance of the covenant and hence to be unable to 
consent to it either truly or freely, believed strongly that baptism should only be available 
to adults (Hut, 1520-27/1991: 161; Grebel, 1524/1991: 127-28; Manz, 1525/1991: 98-
100; Sattler, 1527/1968: 131; Karlstadt cited in Sider, 1974: 292-93). Adult baptism was 
thus vested with an importance far in excess of its conventional sacramental meaning, and 
the role of consent thereby ascribed unprecedented social value. Posited as the single, 
indispensable requirement for novices seeking membership of a covenantal society, it 
provided the foundation upon which such societies were constituted, and, as such, 
became firmly attached, not only to a vision of a spiritual life, but to a specific social 
reality. Whilst faith led the soul in the battle against the corruption and sinfulness of the 
fallen human nature, it was the free choice to comply with the norms and rules of the 
community, which guided and strengthened the earthly battle against the flesh. 
This close association of consent with social order was to prove to be more than a 
peculiarity of the mind of the Reformation. Perennating into the next century, it would 
capture the intellectual tradition of the civil philosophies of modern natural law theory, 
and fortified and consolidated, would endure to the present day. This is not to suggest a 
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direct lineage, with transmission of an unadulterated intellectual inheritance; rather, to 
emphasize that despite their apparent irreconcilable opposition, with the former offering 
blueprints of ‘kingdoms of God on earth’ and the latter reconfiguring designs of the 
secular, they nevertheless shared a common understanding and use of the concept. Both 
claimed the individual subject of consent to possess a will freed from its ‘bondage’ to sin 
and asserted its capability to choose good and useful acts without committing the sin of 
pride (Grotius, 1604/1950: 18-19; Hobbes, 1642/1998: II.I.8, 1889/1969: 12.3-8; 
Pufendorf, 1673/1991: I.9, 11).
24
 Similarly, for both, the presence of consent represented 
more than a general freedom of will. It also marked the willing commitment of the 
subject to a specific order of being and signified the ascendancy of the artificial and 
social over the natural and free. Choosing the exclusive, highly organised mode of life 
practiced in the voluntary and self-selected communities that the radical reformers 
espoused was therefore neither a renunciation of temporal life in favour of a holy one of 
solitude and contemplation, nor the expression of a preference for one social form over 
another. Instead, the abandoned order was seen as mirroring the natural condition of 
fallen humanity, and, with the fundamental nature possessed by all Adam’s descendants 
being corrupt, depraved and full of lust, the world inhabited by Christians bereft of divine 
similitude was simply a natural order of carnal servitude, darkness and sin (Hut, 1520-
27/1991: 164, 166; Grebel, 1524/1991: 42; Sattler, 1527/1968: 132). Similarly, in those 
visions of order advocated by the civil philosophies the choice to live in a community 
grounded upon the consent of its members was predicated upon the rejection of a life of 
absolute freedom in the state of nature (Grotius, 1604/1950: 9-11, 19-21; Hobbes, 
1651/1991: XIII, 1642/1998: I; Pufendorf, 1673/1991: I.3). So whether imagined as a 
‘community of saints’ or as a carefully delimited domain of profanity inhabited by 
secular selves, the social order being envisaged was constituted as a concatenation of 
individually articulated wills of equal standing; wills which, in voluntarily consenting to 




 This demarcation between, on the one hand a natural mode of being associated 
with a space prior to history and apart from society, and on the other, an artificial one 
contingent upon human volition and associated with the order of the social, gave rise to 
two distinct modes by which consent and its relation to selfhood was apprehended. As the 
representation of the will’s elective capabilities and freedom of action consent 
communicated intrinsic essential properties of the ontologically defined self. Yet, though 
marking generic features of humanity it was no longer valorised as central to a 
hermeneutics of action. Consent acquired meaning and significance as an articulation of 
the natural, base self, such that it provided testimony to the individuality of a will both 
unique and free to choose any possibility set before it. What drove individual consent to 
adopt a course of action was neither fate, an a priori recognition of the common good, 
nor obedience to divine commandments; for, whether the creation of an omnipotent and 
benevolent God, or ‘self-begotten’, as with Milton’s rebel angels in Paradise Lost, this 
base self, always ontologically posited prior to the social, inhabited a natural state of 
anomie wherein it cared little as to the wicked or virtuous nature of the acts it performed. 
Here, equal among equals, it fashioned a solitary trail, guiding its actions towards the 
achievement of private ends dictated by its passions, desires or needs, and aided only by 
the precepts of nature that experience and the exercise of reason revealed (Hubmaier, 
1527/1957:16-124; Hobbes 1651/1991:I.13, 1889/1969:I.14.1; Pufendorf 
1672/1729:II.ii.3, 1673/1991:II.1.3-8; Locke 1698/1989:II.ii.4-7).
26
 Thus immune to 
ethical concerns and endowed with a strong subjective quality, consent was now posited 
as a natural and anthropocentric concept, one whose moral significance derived not from 
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its abstraction as a representation of the ontological possibilities of human nature, but 
from its concrete, specific, function as a means to some individual end freely chosen and 
pursued by the consenting subject.   
In addition to this natural and anthropocentric apprehension, consent, remaining 
faithful to its etymological root, also communicated an act of voluntary agreement. As an 
objective descriptor of human action it was concerned with the effects rather than the 
function of the individual will; with the very meaning and significance of consensual acts. 
This normative understanding of consent and its subject could neither boast ontological 
primacy nor dwell in an anomic state because herein the actual performance of 
consensual acts would necessarily be found wanting. Given freely by the natural 
Christian self living in a fallen world seething with animal desires consent could easily 
and unwittingly take the devil’s path, whilst for inhabitants of a natural order in which 
unfettered wills chose as they pleased it was prey to multifarious, often contradictory, 
passions and desires, and hence, was of accidental and fleeting efficacy. So although in 
the state of nature consensual acts remained a possibility, the lack of any will superior to 
that of the natural self, rendered their security conditional upon the strength, cupidity, 
self-interest or self-love of all other agents living in natural equality with the performing 
subject (Hobbes, 1642/1998: II.11, 13 V.1, 1651/1991: I.XV.71; Pufendorf, 1672/1729: 
II.ii.3, VII.i.4, 1673/1991: I.1.11-12, I. 3.4-5, II. 1. 9-10). Accordingly, since the social 
order alone possessed the means of ensuring respect for the performance of voluntary acts 
by directing, suspending or moderating the freedom of human will, this normative 
apprehension of consent could only be envisaged as an occurrence of the social. 
Consensual acts thereby acquired an unprecedented significance. They provided the key 
to the founding covenant, but also bore responsibility for forging the bonds between the 
Christian or civic self and the order of the social.  
The imperatives authorising and justifying the creation of the social were 
predicated neither upon previously extant principles concerning the common good nor 
teleological injunctions about the natural or ethical condition of humanity. Whether that 
which moved the individual will to enter the original covenant was hope of salvation, the 
feebleness of human nature, or the desire for self-preservation, it was recognition of the 
necessity to transgress the state of nature that precipitated the need for the social, whilst it 
was the voluntary and free nature of the consent that provided its moral legitimacy. 
Therefore the only social and ethical bonds the social could legitimately claim were of 
instrumental value, being aimed at the willing acceptance of and compliance with the 
moral entities the social artifice invented, namely, the nexus of public and private rights, 
duties and obligations, which, in functioning as ‘bridles of natural liberty’, directed the 
natural self’s freedom of choice and action (Hobbes 1651/1991: I.xiv, 1642/1998:II-III; 
Pufendorf 1672/1729:I.vi, 1673/1991:I.ii.I.2,15; Selden 1689/1927:36-7).
27
 Without such 
impositions neither self-restraint in regard to self-interest, self-control over one’s own 
passions and desires, nor the cooperation or orderly conflict of individual wills could be 
achieved, and consequently, neither lawfulness and peace nor the justice of the social, be 
maintained.  
Duties and obligations were fulfilled in the ordinary, everyday performance of 
voluntary acts, in the ready exercise of acts of obedience to one’s superiors, and it was in 
the voluntary honouring of contracts, those private agreements forming the sole locus of 
the birth, renouncement or transference of rights, that the triumph of the social over the 
natural was nurtured and its moral legitimacy preserved. Hereafter consensual acts bore 
no truth of the performing subject. Situated within a web of hierarchically structured 
positions, with each anchored in and identified with the performance of specific duties 
and obligations and the possession of corresponding rights, the artificial, socially-created 
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Christian or civic self, now found its truth as the bearer of the sum of rights and 
responsibilities assigned to the office it voluntarily assumed. Moulded by requirements of 
this ‘office’, whether that of preacher, faithful or regenerate, magistrate, master, father, 
husband or monarch, slave, mother, wife or daughter, the social individual was defined, 
evaluated and judged according to the mode, manner and degree to which s/he performed 
specific obligations, fulfilled particular duties and exercised rights whilst respecting those 
of others.    
With the seventeenth century drawing to a close the ancient and scholastic 
conceptual unity of an anthropological and a normative understanding of consent thus 
finally broke down. Unleashed from its past and no longer tied to a hermeneutics of 
action and of self, consent, newly bound to an ontology of the self and a deontology of 
order, would now linger unhindered into its future.  
 
 
Postscript or consent and the nomotechnics of the self 
No longer part of the ‘great chain of being’, that ontological scale upon which everything 
once had been carefully graded according to its degree of ‘perfection’ liberated from 
moral prescriptions of the medieval teleological universe, the subject of the 
anthropocentric understanding of consent became endowed with an unlimited, 
autonomous freedom “….to act in accordance with his own will” and thus be “….subject 
not to another’s will but to his own” (Lovejoy, 1936:58-9; Huizinga, 1963:46-55; 
Grotius, 1604/1950:18). Freely exercising the will’s elective capacity individual agents 
could now initiate, decide upon or veto any course of action they wished; although as 
lone authors of these actions they bore moral responsibility for them as well (Grotius, 
1627/1957:I.iii.viii; Hobbes, 1651/1991: XXI.108; 1673/1991: I.1.9; Pufendorf, 
1673/1991: I.i.10, I.7.5; Locke, 1698/1989: I.ii.7).
28
 This requirement that individual 
consent be freely given also demanded an elective process untrammelled by ‘alien 
elements’; for any influence, even the merest hint of coercion, would be seen as morally 
wrong because it wounded the agent’s autonomy. Thus, despite being held common to all 
humanity, possessed by each individual in equal measure, consensual freedom, in 
embodying the right to exclude all other wills from one’s own decision-making, also 
acquired a distinctly personal and private nature. 
Whether God’s benevolent gift to the first humans, a merciful offering to aid in 
the redemption of the fallen self, or an individual right inscribed in nature’s laws, for 
radical reformers and civil philosophers alike this freedom of the will’s choice was 
fundamental to their understanding of human nature.
29
 As a ‘natural freedom’ it was akin 
to the exclusive ownership of property, such that each individual, as the sole and original 
source of this freedom, enjoyed the right to not only ‘dispose’ of it at will, but to 
legitimately prohibit external attempts to intervene in it (Grotius, 1604/1950:18, 
1625/1957 I.2.1.5, I.17.2; Pufendorf 1673/1991: I.12.3; Lilburne, 1646/1938, 1647/1964: 
2-5; Locke, 1698/1989: II.V.27).
30
 Although invariably extended to embrace the person 
and their life as a whole, this equation of natural freedom with property ownership 
(dominium) enunciated a novel understanding of the relationship between consent and 
selfhood; one clearly manifested in the practices of the radical reformers and explicitly 
theorized in seventeenth century thought (see Buckle, 1991:35-52, 161-179; Tully, 
1982:95-124). Here, consenting subjects claimed total proprietorship of all they called 
their own (suum) alongside the right to prevent its possession by any other.
31
 In so doing, 
they were not only possessive owners, as many have argued, but they were also vigilant 
and watchful owners, standing sentinel over the essential possessions recognised as 
theirs.
32
 Where freely given by the autonomous, natural self, consent served to ethically 
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justify the ‘creation’ of the social. Yet the possessive self’s concern to maintain proper 
respect for his or her material property and ‘natural freedom’, necessitated and sustained 
a voluntary acceptance of the socially instituted ‘fountains’ of authority. Safeguarding 
this possessive self’s property thus fuelled the watchful self’s right to judge the authority 
and the mode of government it had consented to and to respond accordingly. So the 
freedom to grant or withhold consent not only sanctioned the consenting subject’s right to 
interrogate and critique the true nature of the acts of the sovereign authority, but, in light 
of the watchful owner’s obligation of self-defence, it also explicitly granted a mandate to 
resist them whenever necessary. 
Although specific attitudes to the Sword and baptism provided the main division 
between magisterial and radical reformers, questions of consent, government and 
resistance were centrally important to both.
33
 Mainstream reformation leaders, those who 
believed that the power of the Sword ordained by God and passed from Adam to his sons 
maintained the worldly order by punishing evil and protecting good, saw the essential 
duties of the Christian as revolving around obedience and non-resistance. True, many did 
cast doubt upon such duties and advocated the right to resist any government which 
ceased to enjoy its subjects’ consent, but this was a right granted to magistrates in 
response to a tyrant Prince, rather than one belonging to every private person (Luther, 
1526/199:4-10, 34-43; Calvin, 1536/1991:50-55, 56, 74,78-82; Zwingli, 1523 cited in 
Stayer, 1976:61-5; Mornay, 1579/1969:146-56, 167-8, 180-197; Beza, 1574/1969: 101-
10,131-5).
34
 For the radical reformers, the faithful, in voluntarily espousing a separatist 
mode of life, neither participated in civil government nor asked for its justice, and 
therefore owed no such duty of obedience to the godless secular and religious leaders 
they labelled as violators of God’s will and law. Consent to enter the polity of Christians 
and conduct their lives according to its norms, rules, practical values and principles, 
constituted an act of faith based on a conscious and free decision. It was also testimony to 
their individual power to act and choose without ‘external’ influences upon their 
preferred mode of life. So whenever their capacity to freely grant consent was 
endangered, questioned or disputed, as private persons they had a right of resistance and 
self-defence. Hence did zealous consent to a regenerate life often acquire considerable 
political force, not simply inducing castigation and critique of worldly authorities, but 
precipitating acts of civil disobedience, active resistance or even revolutionary violence 
(Karlstadt, 1524/1991 and in Pater 1984:124, 145; Müntzer, 1524/1991: 27-32; 
Hubmaier, 1527/1991:206; Anonymous, 1525/1991: 103-110,118-124; Lilburne  
1645/1965:261,291,1649/1964:402-413; Overton:1646/1976 ).
35
 Couched in religious 
language and frequently interwoven with eschatological arguments and apocalyptic 
visions, the writings of radical reformers advocated ‘grass-roots’, egalitarian, often 
communistic, ways of life grounded upon the individual consent of the faithful, and cast a 
critical eye on the political and social institutions of the time. Provision of real-life 
alternatives gave this stance material hypostasis and, together with their writings, imbued 
considerations of consent with questions of power and truth. Celebrating the right of 
consenting subjects to question the nature and extent of political authority and existing 
practises, they asserted their individual power to resist and thereby provided the first 
locus of modern political critique.
36
 
Over a century later, though proffered in a different language and different spirit, 
modern natural law theory once again placed consent at the heart of a critical discourse 
which also bound the consenting subject to notions of power and truth (see Foucault, 
1996: 385-86). Civil philosophers, in emphasizing the individuality and freedom of the 
will, were essentially seeking to construct a novel moral basis for political authority and 
obligation rather than challenge it (see Tully, 1993:9-10; White, 1996: 11-26; Hunter, 
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2001: 150-1; Hunter and Saunders, 2002: 3-5).
37
 Their efforts to construct models of 
unified and secular sovereignty inevitably engaged with the nature and origin of political 
power, alongside issues of legitimacy, its reasonable limits, and the corresponding rights 
of the subject. Although lacking the radical reformers’ critical thrust, they still discussed 
and theorized widely on religious tolerance, the exercise of right of conscience and 
resistance (Locke, 1675-1679/1997: 230-5, 246-8, 267, 276. See also Laslett, 1989: 34-6, 
79-93; Tuck, 1991: xviii-xxv; Tully, 1991: xvi-xxiv).  
The bare, sovereign self, the ‘atomistic individual’ so often postulated as ancestor 
to our ‘modern and liberal self’; s/he who, in triumphantly entering upon the stage of 
history, captures it in a critical gaze, does however possess a darker, more ‘sinister’ side. 
Posited as the only source of outward action, and in enabling autonomous agents to direct 
their own bodily movements and personal conduct, the natural self’s freedom of will also 
shapes the empirical world they have chosen to live in and allows the possibility of 
voluntarily shying away from exercising this freedom. The original voluntary agreement 
that animated the social, its laws, norms and its system of punishments was, both for 
radical reformers and civil philosophers, an act of profound resignation; for it was not an 
act celebrating the consenting subject’s natural freedom, but rather an act of its 
transgression. This freedom was exchanged for a Christian or civic liberty which bore the 
yoke of normative prescription; for even though the choice to abandon the natural was not 
imposed externally but resulted from self-reflective inquiry, the autonomous possessive 
and watchful subject of consent had now to give way to a watched and, at the same time, 
self-watching subject (Pufendorf, 1672/1729:I.i.3-4; Locke, 1698/1989: II.vi.63). 
Whether envisaged as in thrall to the flesh, permanently at war with all others, or as weak 
and incapable of safe existence, a realisation of the bare self’s lack of resources of 
orderliness, self-help or self-protection led to a free choice of self-effacement. The 
watched and self-watching subject that rose in its place could henceforth only be the 
subject of the normative and juridical understanding of consent, never that of a natural 
and anthropocentric one. However, despite its contrasting so markedly with the free and 
sui iuris natural self, this social and disciplined subject was similarly located within a 
discourse on power, truth and subjectivity. 
This discourse neither asserts possession of critical power, the right to question 
truth, nor criticises the imposition and exercise of sovereign power and its right to define 
what is to be true. Instead it speaks of a true liberty whilst simultaneously exhorting 
obedience and advocating artificial chains, bonds, penalties and moral impositions, all of 
which it sees as emanating from the subject’s consensual acts (Hobbes, 
1642/1998:XIII.15-7, 1651/1991:XXI.108; Pufendorf, 1673/199: I.2.5-8). Premised as the 
first and ultimate source of the power that is exercised in the social order, the subjects of 
consent become themselves the recipients of this power. Bound by their own consensual 
acts, without signs of indocility, they willingly abide within the limits of social liberty 
and come to govern their own conduct according to the prescribed normative 
requirements; those duties, obligations and rights attached to the ‘social offices’ they 
have freely accepted to occupy.
38
 Here consensual acts, acquiring a life of their own, are 
transformed into little more than social practises of subjugation. They themselves are the 
embodiment of power; but a power without a face, a power which neither belongs to nor 
is exercised by subject or sovereign. Instead it is an evasive, insidious power, one which 
relies on its ability to affect conduct, and one which resides in the web of consensual acts 
that authorise, sustain and legitimise the social. It is a power that pervades the social body 
as veins do the corporeal, and a power whose effects bear upon all actions and 
interactions to produce the socially governed and self-governing self (see Foucault, 1982: 
218-22). 
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It is my contention that the double apprehension of consent, as natural and 
anthropocentric and as normative and juridical, together with the discourses on power and 
truth it set in motion, announces both the concept’s modern and feminist history; the 
feminist critic’s location and interrogation of consent within a discourse on power, truth 
and subjectivity. It allows for the granting and withholding of consent to function as an 
axis of freedom and to empower critique, whilst also activating conditions of domination 
and self-subjugation.  
Whether engaging with the employment of consent in theoretical discourses or 
with its function in social and legal practises, the feminist scholar, in associating the 
concept with the possession of liberal subjectivity so remindful of the natural bare self, is 
not just beguiled by the promise of its optimistic imaging. In predicating her critique or 
endorsement of the concept upon its ability to bestow essential, intrinsic qualities of the 
natural self upon the female subject, she seeks to appropriate for herself those possessions 
of freedom, agency, and autonomy, and thereby assert her right as both possessive and 
watchful owner to question the truth of social and political discourses and judge social 
institutions and practises. For her, consent’s seduction therefore lies not only in its 
enticing promise of the riches of the possessive self, but also in the critical power and 
right of resistance enjoyed by the watchful owning self. However, amidst our efforts to 
claim possession of that which history and culture have for so many centuries denied us, 
we can loose sight of the possessive and watchful self’s ‘other’ side, the watched and 
self-watched governable self, the consenting subject of the social order. And in granting 
consent its mythical status as the fundamental guarantee of freedom within the social, we 
remain immune to its starker side, its function as a threat to our freedom.
39
  
In concluding this brief genealogical inquiry into the concept of consent and its 
bearing upon feminist scholarship I realise that I may have opened myself to the criticism 
that I have covered too much ground in too little a space and consequently have omitted 
much. This may indeed be the case, yet I would still maintain the position that the radical 
shift I have identified as occurring in the meaning and understanding of consent, which 
took place in the thought and practises of the sixteenth-century radical reformers and 
seventeenth-century civil philosophies, did indelibly mark its future, laying down the 
conditions that made possible the specific form and priorities of the modern feminist 
explorations of consent. This is neither to deny the concept’s subsequent history in 
political theory and philosophy, for example the works of Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, nor 
to devalue significant feminist work on this area (see Hampton, 1991). It is rather to 
impress upon the reader my view that feminist inquiry, even when attempting alternative 
readings of consent, does so in order to claim possession of the natural and metaphysical 
self, which, whilst boasting ontological primacy and celebrating its freedom, autonomy 
and agency outside history and society, at the same time entrusts its possessions to the 
keep of the social. By emphasizing this modern direction of feminist engagement with 
consent and as a way of bringing my argument to a close, I want to pose the question: Do 
we really need to centre our inquiry on consent on the natural self and the liberal 
subjectivity it promises? It might be that the problem is neither one of a lack of 
recognition of we women as free, autonomous agents, nor the disempowerment this is 
thought to precipitate. Maybe the problem is that female subjectivity is nothing more than 
the historical correlation of processes of subjectification built into our history, social 
technologies prescriptive of the ‘laws’ of the self, such as the structure of consensual acts 
associated with the normative understanding of consent. So perhaps the solution lies in 
our first being able to historically locate such ‘nomotechnics’ of the self and then attempt 
to change them.    
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1
 This list is by no means exhaustive. There is a substantial feminist literature critical of consent in the area of 
obligations. See for example the work of Dalton (1985: esp 1106 ff) and the special issue of Feminist Legal 
Studies (8/1, 2000) on ‘gendered readings of obligations’.      
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2
 Feminist contractarians believe that although the concept of consent evokes images of disembodied and self-
interested subjects, if exercised with respect for women’s autonomy, equality and freedom, it can be 
successfully employed in the context of women’s personal relationships. See, for example, Okin (1989), 
Hampton (1993) and Jaggar (1993). For an overview, see Brennan (1999: 874-79). Of those arguing that 
consent should be replaced by another liberal value, MacKinnon (1982, 1983) favours self-determination, 
Nedelsky (1989) favours autonomy, and Nussbaum (1999: 29-32) dignity. A substantial feminist literature 
embracing ‘relational feminism’ or ‘the care perspective’ advocates abandoning consent and liberal 
individualism altogether, but does not directly engage with the concept of consent. For a discussion of the 
impact of the ‘care perspective’ in political theory and moral philosophy, see Benhabib (1987), Hekman 
(1995) and Sevenhuijen (1998). For a discussion in relation to law, see Sevenhuijen (1991) and Drakopoulou 
(2000). 
3
 This category of consensual contract had no counterpart in Greek law, where the legal recognition of 
contract was premised upon its performance and not simply upon the presence of consent (Πανταζόπουλος 
1968: 61-62; Cohen, 2005: 298-99; Rupprecht, 2005: 335-37). 
4
 Of course the requirement for consent did not necessarily mean that of the bride and groom. For example in 
early Rome it was that of the pater familias (Treggiari, 1991: 16). For a discussion of the significance of 
consent in Roman marriage and cohabitation see Reynolds (1994: 22-30), Sohm (1907: 456-57) and Treggiari 
(1991: 146-47, 70-76). For a discussion of the coercion of consent, see Saller (1993). In Greek law, consent 
was also crucial to betrothal and marriage, but only the consent of the fathers of the bride and groom (Sealey, 
1990: 25-26, 86-88; Cantarella, 2005: 246-47; Maffi, 2005: 254). 
5
 Similarly, notions of duress, fraud and mistake, though acknowledged as defences in consensual contracts, 
were never explained in terms of any theoretical understanding of what constituted consent (Gordley. 1992: 
33). 
6
 It was in the teachings of Chrysippus in particular (circa 280 BC) that the concept of consent held a pivotal 
position (Inwood 1987:54; Kahn 1988:245; Sandbach 1994:121).  
7
 In this paper I am using the concepts of consent and assent interchangeably.  They both have a common 
etymological root though consent seems to emphasize more an inter-relational element. However later in the 
Middle Ages consent as a concept was used in relation to the will, while assent to the intellect (Aquinas, 
1265-74/1970: Ia2ae.15.3). A similar distinction is preserved in the Oxford English dictionary. 
8
 The Stoics perceived the soul as having a material existence. It was thought to be a ‘breath’, a compound of 
air and constructive fire integrated throughout the body (including flesh, bones, sinew, etc) and to which it 
gave life, warmth, growth and maintenance. However the soul was also believed to possess a commanding 
part (the hegemonikon), which was the seat of reason, assent, impulse, passion and sensation (Long and 
Sedley, 1987: 53h, k-m). For the presentation of the Stoic sources on the soul, see Long and Sedley (1987: 
53); for an exposition of the Stoic concept of the soul, see Sandbach (1994: 82-85) and Long (1982).    
9
 In stating that these obligations were natural the Romans did not consider them to derive from a natural or 
divine order they thought superior to the ius gentium. For a discussion of the Roman conception of natural 
law and its relation to ius gentium, see Levy (1949). This distinction between natural obligations arising in the 
ius gentium and civil ones arising in civil law continued in the writings of the medieval jurists (Gordley, 
1992: 41-45).    
10 The Stoics maintained a monistic theory of human activity according to which the process of generating 
voluntary action was always rational. In contrast, Aristotle and Plato acknowledged two distinct faculties, 
reason and the passions, both of which were instrumental in the production of activity. Conduct guided by the 
passions and sensual appetite and not by the intellect and deliberation, though voluntary, was considered to be 
irrational.  
11
 Children below ‘the age of reason’, those under seven years old (full acquisition did not take place until the 
age of 14), were said to lack the power of assent. Like animals, they could not help but yield to the power of 
presentations (Inwood, 1987: 72-75; Sandbach, 1994: 3). Similarly, a lack of education or ignorance was also 
thought to produce only a ‘weak’ assent (Annas, 1990: 187-88). 
12
 This apprehension of freedom as obedience, which may be seen as prophetically announcing the coming of 
Christianity, is powerfully evidenced in Cleanthes’ famous Hymn to Zeus. Cleanthes was a student of 
Chrysippus. The text of the Hymn may be found in Long and Sedley (1987: 54i).  
13 This interpretation of the self through its acts was perhaps most clearly evidenced in Stoic admonitions to 
review one’s own actions through a process of personal introspection, often represented as a form of inner 
dialogue functioning as a means of recollecting one’s own acts and measuring them against what ought to be 
done so that a closer correlation between personal character and future purposive action would be secured. 
For examples of the process of thinking as an inner dialogue see Epictetus (1928: 1.1.7, 2.1.4, 2.22.29, 
4.6.34), Seneca (1995: iii.12.2-4, 26.3-5, 36) and Marcus Aurelius (1989: xii.I8). For a further discussion of 
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the Stoic conception of the inner dialogue see Gill (1998: 56-60, 226-32), Inwood (1987: 81-85), Long (1991: 
111-20) and Foucault (1993: 206-7).  
14
 It has been argued very persuasively that a concept of Will as a distinct faculty was unknown to ancient 
Greek philosophers and that it only emerged in the writings of St Augustine (Dihle, 1982: 20-67, 123; Kahn, 
1988: 234-47). For a discussion of the concept of Will in Hellenistic and Latin philosophy see Gilbert (1963) 
and specifically in Augustine see Dihle (1982: 123-44) and Spencer (1931: 473-76).      
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The Schleitheim Confession of Faith, the oldest creedal statement of the Anabaptists proclaimed in a 
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For a discussion of the radical reformer’s views on the possession of freedom of will and reason as an inward 
experience of the divine guiding life, see Jones (1914: xxii-xxxviii). 
27
 For a discussion of Selden’s ideas of consent, contract and obligation see Tuck (1979:82-100). 
28
 Although there was a difference of opinion as to whether the freedom of will included the freedom to will 
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writings of seventeenth-century natural law theories. For a discussion of this point in relation to Grotius see 
Tully (1982: 68-72).  
31
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two into a theocratic model of government which he instituted in Geneva. For a discussion of Zwingli’s ideas, 
see Stayer (1976:49-69).  
34
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an intellectual reaction against Catholic scholasticism and its varied strands, comprised different strategies for 
justifying political authority. They identify as common themes permeating these strategies, their juridical and 
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